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ABSTRACT
We investigate the economic effects of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) using
large longitudinal establishment and firm-level Census Bureau data sets linked
to a list of LBOs compiled from public data sources. About 5 percent, or 1100,
of the manufacturing plants in the sample were involved in LBOs during 1981-86.
We find that plants involved in LEOs had significantly higher rates of total-
factor productivity (TFP) growth than other plants in the same industry. The
productivity impact of LBOs is much larger than our previous estimates of the
productivity impact of ownership changes in general. Management buyouts appear
to have a particularly strong positive effect on TFP.
Labor and capital employed tend to decline (relative to the industry
average) after the buyout, but at a slower rate than they did before the
buyout. The ratio of nonproduction to production labor cost declines sharply,
and production worker wage rates increase, following LBOs. LBOs are
production-labor-using, nonproduction-labor-saving, organizational innova-
tions. Plants involved in management buyouts (but not in other LBOs) are less
likely to subsequently close than other plants. The average R&D-intensity of
firms involved in LEOs increased at least as much from 1978 to 1986 as did the
average R&D-intensity of all firms responding to the NSF/Census survey of
industrial R&D.
Frank R. Lichtenberg Donald Siegel
National Bureau of Economic National Bureau of Economic Research
Research and 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Columbia University Cambridge, MA 02138
726 Uris Hall
New York, NY 10027I.Introduction
In a previous study (Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987)), we examined the
relationship between productivity and changes in ownership (coninonly
referred to as "mergers and acquisitions") of U.S. manufacturing plants
during the 1970s. We found that the least productive plants in an
industry are most likely to subsequently change owners, and that follow-
ing ownership change, these plants tend to experience above-average
improvements in productivity. A more recent paper (Lichtenberg and
Siegel (1989a)) indicated that changes in ownership are associated with
substantial reductions in administrative overhead --measuredby the
ratio of "central—office" (auxiliary-establishment) employees to plant
employees --andthat this is a major source of takeover-related produc-
tivity gains.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of a specif-
ic, and increasingly important, type of ownership change --theleveraged
buyout (LBO) --ontotal-factor productivity and related aspects of firm
behavior.In an LBO, a group of investors (which sometimes includes
incumbent management) takes a company (or a division of a company)
private by purchasing all of the outstanding equity of the company,
mainly using borrowed funds. The enterprise is much more highly lever-
aged (it has a higher debt/equity ratio) after the LBO than before. The
financing of LBOs often involves the sale of high-yield (or "junk")
bonds. The debt incurred to buy out the company is expected to be
serviced by a combination of operating income and asset sales.
Although the LBO transaction has been in existence for at least20
years, only in the 1980s has it become a quantitatively significant
component of overall merger and acquisition (M&A) activity.The share of2
LBOsin the aggregate value of M&A transactions increased from almost
zero in the 1970s to 27 percent in 1986. This increase is probably
attributable to an important extent to the invention and diffusion of
junk bond financing beginning in the late 1970s. Because the extent of
LBO activity was negligible prior to about 1981, our analysis will focus
primarily on the period 1981-86. 1986 is the latest year for which
Census data were available; this is unfortunate because most of the LBOs
during this period occurred in the last three years. This limits our
ability to measure behavior in the years following the LBO. Neverthe-
less, our sample is large enough that we can obtain reasonably precise
estimates for at least two years following the buyout.
One major advantage of the Census Bureau data sets is that they,
unlike publicly available data sources, include observations on privately
as well as publicly owned firms and establishments. As noted above,
firms that have undergone an LBO are (at least initially)1 privately
held. Privately-held companies are generally not required by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue financial data, which clearly
poses a problem for assessing post-buyoutperformance.2
1 A number of firms involved in LBOs subsequently underwent "reverse
LBOs," i.e. they became (or were acquired by) publicly-held compa-
nies, especially after 1986. See Forbes, March 20, 1989, pp.
210-211.
2 Under special circumstances, such data may be available. Smith
(1989) obtained data on post-buyout corporate performance for only
58 out of 215 management buyouts from the following sources:
prospectuses issued by 17 companies with a subsequent offering of
common stock; other SEC filings of 32 companies with public debt or
preferred stock outstanding after the MBO; and financial statements
released confidentially by 9 companies. As Smith acknowledges,
there is a strong possibility that the 58 companies for which data
are available are not a random sample of all 215 companies, and
therefore that the findings based on this subset are biased, al-
though she makes a fairly convincing case that her results are not3
A second important advantage of the establishment-level Census data
is that they enable us to analyze partial-firm (subsidiary) LBOs. 46
percent of the LBOs in our sample were of divisions of firms rather than
entire firms. Because data at the divisional or lower level are not
generally publicly available --evenfor publicly-held firms --previous
studies (e.g. Kaplan (1988), Smith (1989)) have had to confine their
attention to buyouts of entire firms. Moreover, LBOs are frequently
followed by divestiture of some of the firm's plants or lines of busi-
ness, further limiting the usefulness of company-level data.
Our primary objective is to analyze the relationship between LBOs
and total factor productivity --outputper unit of total input --
althoughwe will also consider the effects of LBOs on other, related,
aspects of firm behavior such as output, employment, capital stock,
wages, plant closings, and R&D investment. TFP is perhaps the single
best measure of technical efficiency, and in his pioneering studies in
the 1950s Robert Solow (1957) established that most of the long-run
increases in economic welfare (output per capita) experienced by the U.S.
and other industrialized countries have been due to increases in TFP.
Acquisition of a firm via leveraged buyout might be expected to
result in an increase in its relative TFP because compensation (of senior
managers and perhaps of other employees as well) --andindeed the very
survival of the firm --ismuch more strongly related to performance
seriously affected by sample-selection bias. Nevertheless, it is
clearly preferable to conduct the analysis using a data set not
subject to this kind of censoring.
As we discuss below the extract of the Census Longitudinal Research
Database (LRD) we use is also subject to censoring, albeit of a
different, presumably less important, kind.4
after the buyout than before. Jensen (1989, P. 5) states that the
average CEO in a sampleof LBOs receives at least $64 per $1000 change in
shareholder wealth from his typical 6.4% equity interest, whereas the
average CEO in the Forbes 1000 firms experiencestotal wealth change of
about $2 per $1000 change in stockholder value. If the firm's earnings
are insufficient to cover the interest payment on the debtincurred to
finance the buyout, the managers also face the risk of losing control of
the firm to the bondholders. This increases the rewards for strong
performance (and increases the penalty for poor performance).Jensen has
also argued that large fixed interest obligations, by reducing the amount
of "free cash flow," reduce the likelihood and extent of investment in
"unproductive" projects. Thus changes in both the incentives and oppor-
tunities facing managers are hypothesized to lead to improvements in
productivity.3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we document the growth in LEO activity in greater detail and
describe the construction of our data base. The development and analysis
of the TFP measure is presented in Section III. The decomposition of TFP
changes into output and input changes is reported in Section IV. Rela-
tive rates of plant closings among LEO and non-LBO plants, and their
possible implications, are discussed in Section V. Section VI is devoted
3 While the LEO organizational form may generate higher average
economic "returns" (productivity) than the prototypical public
corporation, it is also subject to greater (financial) rx. One
view of the rise of LBOs is that the higher potential returns to
this organizational form were more than sufficient to compensate
investors for their higher risk. Our empirical work is aimed at
determining the difference in mean returns (productivity), but not
the difference in risk, between LEO and non-LEO firms or plants.S
to an analysis of the effects of LBOs on R&D investment. A summary and
concluding remarks are given in the last section.
II. Linking Census data to the external list of LBOS
Table 1 presents annual data published by Mergers and Acquisitions
magazine on the aggregate value and number of LBOs for the years 1981-86.
(Prior to 1981, the extent of LBO activity was apparently very limited.
There were only 3 LBOs of at least $35 million in value in both 1979 and
1980, and in both years the aggregate value was under $1 billion.) Also
included in Table 1 as a benchmark are data published by W.T. Grimm and
Co. on all merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. Both the number
and total value (but not the average value) of LBOs increased in every
year. The largest jumps in value occurred in 1984 and 1986, and probably
reflect a few very large transactions. Between 1981 and 1986, the number
of LBOs more than tripled, and their total value increased more than
fifteen-fold. The number and value of M&As also tended to increase
during this period (following a period of steady decline since 1969), but
at a much lower rate. The number of M&As increased 39 percent, and their
nominal value less than tripled. Between 1981 and 1986, the LBO share of
the number of deals increased from 4.1 percent to 10.0 percent, and the
LBO share of the total value increased from 3.7 percent to 26.9 percent.
In the first three years the average size of LBO transactions tended to
be somewhat smaller than that of all M&A transactions, but in the last
three years have tended to be considerably larger.
Unfortunately, we had access to data on individual LBOs only for
LBOs whose value was at least $35 million (henceforth referred to as6
"major LBOs"). The bottom panel of Table 1 presents data for this subset
of deals.4 In principle, of course, the total value of major LBOs cannot
exceed the total value of all LBOs, but the data for the two groups come
from different sources which in some cases assign different values to a
given deal, so this inequality is sometimes violated in practice. Never-
theless, comparison of the top and bottom panels of the table provides a
rough guide to the effect of the $35 million threshhold. For the period
as a whole, major LBOs account for 19 percent of the deals but for 96
percent of the total value. Because the same nominal threshhold was in
effect in every year, the fraction of deals exceeding the threshhold
(hence observed by us) tended to be larger towards the end of the period.
In order to assess the effect of LBOs on the performance and conduct
of the firms involved, we linked the data contained in the list of major
LBOs to an extract we prepared of data on individual manufacturing
establishments contained in the Census Bureau's LED.5
4 Data on these individual LBOs were provided to us by Morgan Stanley
and Co., which compiles its own exhaustive database of all major
mergers and acquisitions, of which LBOs are a subset. The primary
sources from which the database is compiled are reports in the
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones Tapes, and news
releases. Transactions are identified as LBOs in the Morgan Stanley
database if they are reported as such in the primary sources.We
did not have access to data on individual M&As; we present data on
M&As of at least $35 million only for purposes of comparison.
5 The LRD is a large micro database of establishment-level data
constructed by pooling information from the quinquennial Census of
Manufactures and from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. See
McGuckin and Pascoe (1988) for a detailed discussion of the LED.
Data for between 310 and 350 thousand establishments are included
for each of five Census years (1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982),
and for between 52 and 74 thousand establishments in non-Census
years from 1973 to 1986. In our 1987 paper we analyzed data for the
years 1972 through 1981 --thelatest year for which data were
available at the time. We restricted our sample to include only
those establishments that were observed in every one of the tea
years 1972-81. Thus plants that opened or closed and plants that7
Roach (1989, p. 24) estimates that 63 percent of the total value of
the major LBOs during the period 1978-88 involved companies or divisions
whose primary industry is manufacturing. Since only manufacturing
establishments (and not, for example, retail and service establishments)
are included in the LRD, if the sizes of LBOs in manufacturing and other
sectors are similar one would expect to identify establishments in it
corresponding to no more than about 60 percent of the (number or value
of) LBOs. As Table 2 reveals, we were able to observe one or more
establishments of companies involved in 57 percent (by value) of the
major LBOs. Thus within the constraints of the deal-size threshhold and
the industry (manufacturing only) limitation, the "coverage" provided by
the LRD appears to be quite good.
The establishment records in the LRD indicate both a code identify-
ing the establishment's parent company and the (4-digit SIC) industry in
which the establishment (primarily) operates. To determine whether an
establishment had been involved in an LBO in a particular year, we
adopted the following procedure (See Chart 1). We looked to see whether
were admitted or deleted from the ASH sample during the period were
excluded from our sample, which as a result contained data for
20,493 establishments. To perform the present study we extended the
data for these 20,493 establishments through 1986 using the newly
available data for the years 1982-86. We did not include data for
plants that were not already present in our earlier file, i.e. we
did not include data for plants that opened or were admitted into
the ASH sample after 1981. However, to remain in our sample we did
not insist that an establishment be observed (operating and in the
ASH sample) in each of the years 1982-86. Thus, our panel of
establishments is "unbalanced" after 1981, and by 1986 the number of
plants has fallen to about 14,300.
In retrospect, the above procedure for constructing our database was
probably not an optimal one, although we doubt that our findings
have been strongly influenced by this procedure. We hope in future
work to re-examine some of these issues using a more representative
database.8
the parent COpany'S name appeared on the list of companiesacquired via
LBOs in tb.at year. If riot, we assigned the codeLBOO (not involved in
an LBO in that year). If so, we determinedwhether the LBO was of the
entire company or only of a part of thecompany.6 If the LBO was of the
entire firm, the establishment was assigned the code LBOl (involvedin
an LBO in that year). If the LBO was of only partof the company, we
developed a list of SIC codes of the acquired unitbased on a "business
description" of the unit contained in the Morgan Stanleydatabase.
Additional information about the industrial activities of divisions or
companies was obtained from Standard and Poor's Registryof Corporations
and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. If theestablishment's SIC
code was included in this list, we assigned the code LBO1; othervise we
assigned the code LBO=O.
Our procedure for assigning values to the LBO code is undoubtedly
subject to error, particularly in the case of partial-firmLEOs. For
example, if two subsidiaries of a firm both have plants inthe same
industry, and only one of the subsidiaries is involved in an LBO,then we
would erroneously assign the value LBO =1to both subsidiaries'
establishments.7 If, however, such measurement errors are random (which
we expect to be the case), then their effect will be to reducethe
magnitude and significance of the estimated differences inbehavior
between LBO and non-LBO establishments.
6 As Table 3 shows, "partial" LBOs account for 39 percent of all LBOs
captured in the LRD file.
7 This may not be a serious problem, however, since McGuckin and
Andrews (1988) found that firms rarely divest only some of their
plants in a given 4-digit industry.9
Several previous empirical studies (Kaplan (1988) and Smith (1989))
have been concerned with so-called management buyouts (MBOs), the subset
of LBOs in which the acquiror includes the incumbent managers of the
acquired unit. Since the description of the acquiror indicates whether
or not management participated in the acquisition, we can distinguish
(albeit perhaps imperfectly) between 1BOs and other LBOs. As Table 3
reveals, NBOs accounted for 45 percent of the value of all major LBOs
during the period 1981_86.8 Among major LBOs captured in our extract of
the LED, however, ?lBOs accounted for only 27 percent of total value,
perhaps because management is less likely to participate in LBOs in
manufacturing than in other sectors.
Our extract from the LED contained data on 20,493 manufacturing
establishments for the year 1981. 1108 (5.4 percent) of these estab-
lishments were involved in at least one major LBOduringthe period
1981-86. The distribution of establishments involved in major LBOs
(henceforth"LBO establishments"), by type of LBO, is presented in Table
4. 35 percent of the LBO establishments were involved in MBOs, and 30
percent were involved in partial-firm LBOs. These two attributes are
correlated: MBOs account for 47 percent of partial-firm LBOs but only 30
percent of full-firm LBOs.
The establishment records in the LED also include a "coverage code"
which indicates, among other things, whether or not the owner of the
establishment (i.e., the ultimate parent corporation) had changed since
the previous year9. This coverage code was used to distinguish between
8 The share of MBOs increased fairly steadily over time.
9 We also used the coverage code to Identify incidents of plant
closing. This issue will be discussed in Section V.10
establishmentschanging and not changing owners in our two previous
studies (1987, 1989a) of ownership change. Since LBOs constitute a
special case of the general phenomenon of ownership change, one might
expect that virtually all the establishments that weidentified as being
involved in LBOs (via the procedure outlined above) would have Census
coverage codes indicating a change in ownership inthe year of the LBO.
We discovered, however, that the measured rate of ownership change duriig
1981-86 among LBO plants was substantially less than 100 percent --it
was 37 percent --althoughit was about double the rate among non-LBO
plants. Moreover, the higher six-year rate of ownership change amongLBO
plants was to an important extent accounted for by higher frequencyof
ownership change in years following the LBO.
Although these findings appear to be anomalous, they may to some
extent simply reflect two features of the Census Bureau's procedure for
recording ownership change in the plant files. First, the Bureau gener-
ally records ownership change only when there is a true merger in the
sense that operating units are combined under common ownership or one
firm is split into two or more operating units. One would therefore
expect there to be a higher measured rate of ownership change among
plantsinvolved in partial than in full-firm LBOs, which is in fact the
case.'° Second, the Bureau obtains ownership information from an
independent, firm—level "Report of Organization" and processes it into
the plant files with a 1 -2year lag. Some ownership changes (particu-
larly those involving small firms) are therefore reported as occurring in
10Plants involved in partial LBOs were about twice as likely to be
coded as ownership—change plants as plants involved in full-firm
LBOs: the respective ownership change rates were 56 and 29 percent.11
years following the actual ownership change. Also, many of the LBOs
occurred in 1985 and 1986, and the ownership information for these years
may not have been entered (even with a lag) into the files we analyzed.
III. Comparisons of productivity of buyout and non-buyout plants
In this section we describe and analyze differences in total-factor
productivity (TEl') behavior between plants involved in LBOs (or MBOs) and
other plants. Our measure of TFP is a (raw or studentized) residual from
a production function of the following form, estimated separately by









where VQ denotes the value of production (the value of shipments adjusted
for changes in finished-goods and work-in-process inventories); L denotes
labor input ("production-workerequiValeflt" manhours); K denotes capital
input (the "perpetual inventory" estimate of the net stock of plant and
equipment); V!1 denotes the value of materials consumed (materials pur-
chased adjusted for changes in raw-materials inventories); u is a distur-
bance term; and the subscript ijt refers to establishment i in 4-digit
SIC industry j in year t.11 Output and materials are measured in nominal
11This (generalized) Cobb-Douglas production function may be regarded
as a local first-order logarithmic approximation to any arbitrary
production function. ?laddala (1979, p. 309) has shown that,at
least within a "limited class of functions ...(viz.Cobb—Douglas,
generalized Leontief, homogeneous translog, and homogeneous quadrat-
ic) differences in the functional form produce negligible differ-
ences in measures of multi-factor productivity." This isbecause
these different functional forms differ in their elasticities of
substitution (which depends on the second derivatives of the produc12
termsbecause the LRD does not include establishment-specific deflators.
It is conventional to assume that output and materials prices do not vary
across establishments within an industry, which would imply that the
nominal measures are proportional to their real counterparts, although
there is evidence inconsistent with this hypothesis (see Abbott (1988)).
Thus the computed residual may be capturing price differences as well as
productivity differences. Because eq. (1) was estimated separately by
industry and year, the residual for a given observation measures the
percentage deviation of that establishment's TFP from the mean TFP of all
establishments in the same industry and year. By construction, of
course, the residuals have a mean value of zero.
Although the production function (1) is estimated separately by
industry and year, we will pool the estimated residuals across industries
(and sometimes also across years). The estimated residual variance
=
1 e2. varied over j and t, so a given value of a
raw residual e.. represented a larger relative departure from mean
productivity in some industries and years (those with "low" than in
others. In addition to examining the raw residuals, we therefore also
examined the "studentized" residuals e.. /. ,whichare the raw resi-
ijtjt
dualsscaled by the corresponding estimated standard error of the regres
sion (1). An observation whose studentized residual is say, 0.5, has
productivity half a standard deviation above average.
Our first approach to assessing the impact of LBOs on productivity
is to estimate the difference in the growth in TFP during 1981-86 between
tion function) whereas productivity depends primarily on the first
derivatives.13
plants involved in LBOs during that period and other plants, conditional
on the level of productivity in 1981. The coefficient from the
following regression is an estimate of this difference in growth rates:
— +




where Y denotes either the raw residual or the studentized residual, and
X denotes either an LBO dummy (1if the establishment was involved in
an LBO during 1981-86, =0otherwise) or an MBO dummy (defined
similarly).12 The coefficient on 1981 productivity is specified as a
free parameter rather than constrained to equal unity to allow for the
possibility that productivity growth depends on the initial productivity
level (i.e., productivity is not a random walk), and for a correlation
between X and initial productivity. Estimates of the parameter 'from
eq. (2) are reported in Table13 Each of the coefficients reported in
Table 5 comes from a separate regression. The first line displays
estimates based on the raw residual as the productivity measure. It
12Because Y..81 is a residual estimated from the first-stage eq. (1)
rather than the true but unobserved productivity disturbance, as
Murphy and Topel (1985) show the OLS standard errors (t-statistics)
are probably biased downward (upward). (The fact that the dependent
variable Y..86 is also estimated apparently doesn't result in any
such bias.) We plan in the future to calculate corrected standard
errors using their formula for the asymptotic covariance matrix.
However one of their empirical illustrations (see p. 313 of their
article) suggests that, because the variable X1381_86 was excluded
from the first-stage eq., the bias in the OLS standard error of yj,
ifany, is small. In their example, it was on theorder of
3 percent.
13Estimates of Y2 and their corresponding standard errors (in paren-
theses) are .879 (.022) and .342 (.009) for the raw andstudentized
residuals, respectively. The results are the same in the caseof
the LBO and MBO specifications.14
indicatesthat the (cumulative) productivity growth during 1981-86 of
plants involved in LBOs was 2.8 percentage points higherthan that of
plants not involved in LBOs; the difference in growth rates is highly
statistically significaflt.14 The difference in growth rates was even
higher --3.9percentage points --inthe case of establishments involved
in management buyouts.'5 The estimates based on the studentized
residuals are qualitatively similar to those based on the raw residuals:
they are highly (indeed slightly more) significant, and the relative
magnitudes of the LBO and tIBO coefficients are similar. Because the
results based on the raw residuals are more easily compared to other
productivity data, henceforth we will confine our attention tothese.'6
14About 9.5 percent of LBO plants, and 10.2 percent of non-LBO plants,
were not in the same 4-digit industry in 1986 as they were in 1981.
For plants switching industries, the "reference group" for calculat-
ing relative productivity changed. We tried to examine whether
switching of industries affected our estimates of y by also includ-
ing in eq. (2) a duny variable equal to one if a plant switched
industries, and otherwise equal to zero. The coefficient
(t-statistic) on this duniny in the raw residual specification was
-.011(1.3) --negativebut only marginally significant --andthe
estimate of y was virtually unchanged.
15We also estimated a version of eq. (2) including two buyout duixiny
variables, one for management buyouts and one for "other LBOs"
(non-management buyouts). The coefficients on "other LBOs" from the
raw and studentized residual regressions were respectively
.016(1.30) and .064(1.55). Thus they were only marginally signifi-
cantly different from zero, but we could not reject the hypothesis
that the coefficients on ?lBOs and other LBOs were identical.
16OLS estimation using studentized residuals is similar to weighted
least-squares (WLS) estimation using raw residuals, with weights
S.1 that are identical for all plants in the same industry in the
same year. One might argue that it would be preferable to use
weights that vary across plants within industries and years, in
particular to use as the weight the reciprocal of the square root of
the estimated standard error of the residual
jt2c1 -
where is the design matrix from eq. (1) for industry j in year t15
Data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on TFP growth
in the manufacturing sector as a whole provide a convenient, although
possibly biased, benchmark against which to measure the LBO-related
productivity growth differential cited above.17 According to the BLS
(1988, p. 12) TFP in the manufacturing sector increased 19.9 percent from
1981 to 1986. This figure may be considered a weighted average of the
productivity growth rates of LBO and non-LBO plants, with weights roughly









where' andltNONLBO denote the productivity growth rates of all
plants, LBOplants,and non-LEO plants, respectively, and 5LBO denotes
thefraction of all workers employed in plants that are involved in LBOs,
18
estimated to be 5.25 percent. The data reported above imply that
and X. .isthe 1th row of this matrix (i.e., the row corresponding
to the Iplant). See Neter et al (1985, p. 402) for a derivation
of this formula. We have taken this approach in estimating other
equations with the same dependent variable as eq. (2) (but different
independent variables), and found that relative to OLS estimation
using raw residuals, it increased the magnitude of the parameter
estimates and R2 by 14 to 28 percent and reduced the standard errors
by 7 to 15 percent. We therefore plan in the future to apply this
procedure to the estimation of eq. (2).
17We lack output and materials deflators at the 4-digit industry level
for the last few years of our sample period. Otherwise, of course,
we could compute separate productivity growth rates for both LEOand
non-LBO plants, not merely the difference between these growth
rates. Since our original (1972-81) sample of plants accounted for
67 percent of aggregate manufacturing shipments (see p. 651 of our
1987 paper), we believe that the BLS number provides a reasonable
approximation of average productivity growth in our sample.
18Equation (2) was estimated using data only for the 14281 plantsthat
had nonmissing data in each of the years 1981-86. 933 (6.5 percent)
of these plants were involved in LBOs during that interval. LBO16
it= .199and that -
"NoN-LBo
=.028,from which we may infer that
7tNON_LBO
=.198and LBO =.226.The productivity growth rate of LBO
plants was therefore about 14 percent higherthan that of other plants.
The productivity growth rate of MBO plants was about 20 percent higher
than that of plants not involved in MBOs.
In a previous (1987) paper we estimated the difference in produc-
tivity growth rates during 1974-80 between plants involved in ownership
changes of all kinds (as measured in the LRD file) and plants notin-
volved in ownership change. The estimated difference (n -ItN0N0c),
although highly significantly different from zero, was considerably
smaller than our estimate of LBo -itNON_LBO).
it was approximately
.005. However, the overall rate of manufacturing productivity growth
during 1974-80 was much lower than it was during 1981-86: productivity
increased only 5.6 percent from 1974 to 1980. Since approximately 15
percent of plants changed owners during the period 1974-80, our previous
estimates implied that during that period 7tNON oc =.055and =.060.
Thus the productivity growth rate of plants changing owners was about 9
percent higher than that of plants not changing owners. The percentage
difference -
1tNoN_oc)/NoN_oC
is about two-thirds as large as the
percentage difference (7t-
Ourestimates of (n0- 7toNL),like our original estimates of
-
NON—OC'
are based on data only for operating manufacturing
establishments. Due to the unavailability of data, so-called "auxiliary
establishments," which include central administrative offices and other
of these plants was 5.5 percent in 1981 and 5.0 percent in 1986, the
mean of which is 5.25 percent.17
nonproduction facilities, were excluded from the econometric analysis in
our first paper and in this one. In 1982, auxiliary establishments
accounted for about 7 percent of employment and 10 percent of payroll in
manufacturing. Unfortunately, data for these establishments are collect-
ed only every five years, and the latest year for which they are current-
ly available is 198219 Auxiliary establishments do not produce any
marketable output; rather, they provide services (such as administration,
R&D, and data processing) to the firm's production establishments. If
the effect of ownership change (or LBO) on employment, for example, in
auxiliary establishments is different from its effect in manufacturing
establishments, then estimates of the difference - ILN0N0c)(or
LBO- NoN-LBobased only on manufacturing establishment data will be
biased. In the sequel to our original paper, we showed that ownership
change tends to be accompanied by significant (approximately 11 percent)
reductions in the ratio of auxiliary-establishment to production-
establishment employment. Failure to account for this reduction in
administrative overhead led to substantial underestimation in our origi-
nal paper of the effect of ownership change on productivity growth
-
NoN-o&Accounting for this increased our estimate of
-
"NON-OC)by .0034, from .0046 to .0080. While we don't have
estimates of the effect of LBOs on the ratio R of auxiliary-establishment
to production-establishement employment, it is quite plausible that it is
as least as negative as the effect of ownership change on R. Indeed,
statements by Jensen (1989, p. 3) imply that the effect may be much
greater in magnitude:
19The 1987 data will probably become available in 1990.18
LEO associations ... arerun by partnerships instead of
the headquarters office in the typical large multi-
business diversified corporation. These partnerships
perform the monitoring and peak coordination function with
a staff numbering in the tens of people, and replace the
typical corporate headquarters staff of thousands.
If we assume that the effect of LBOs on R is (merely) equal to the effect
of ownership change on R, we would raise our estimate ofLBO
-
7tN0NLBo)
from .0280 (in Table 5) to .0314; if the actual effect on R is larger,
even this adjusted figure would understate the true productivity growth
differential.
So far we have analyzed the link between LBOs and productivity
change by computing the difference in growth rates of TFP over a six year
period (1981-86) between plants involved and not involved in LBOs at any
time during the period. An alternative approach, which we pursue next,
is to compute differences in the mean (level of the) productivity residu-
al in year t+k (k-13,-l2,. ..,—1,0,1,2)between plants involved and not
involved in LEOs in year t. This approach has both an advantage and a
disadvantage relative to the first approach. The advantage is that it
provides evidence concerning the precise timing of productivity movements
relative to the date of the LEO. (It is possible, for example, that the
higher five-year productivity growth rate of LEO plants is due primarily
or entirely to higher growth before the LEO.)20 The disadvantage is that
differences in annual productivity changes are estimated less precisely
than differences in five-year growth rates. This is partly due to the
20Further analysis along the lines of Table 5 cast doubt on this
possibility, however. When we replaced the single (1981-86) LEO
dummy by two LEO dummies -—"early"(1981-83) and "late" (1984-86)
--theirrespective coefficients were .033 and .021, i.e. "early"
LEOs were associated with higher productivity increases, although
the difference in coefficients was not significant.19
fact that the fraction of plants involved in an LBO during a single year
is smaller than the fraction (ever) involved during a six-year period.
Our estimates of LBO vs. non-LBO mean productivity differences are
obtained by regressing the residual on an LBO dummy variable; the latter
may be viewed as a binomially distributed random variable, equal to 1 (if
and only if an LBO occurs) with probability 0, and equal to 0 with
probability 1-0. The variance of the LBO dummy is N0(1-0), which is an
increasing function of 0 (provided that 0 < .5, which is true in our
data). Since the variance of the coefficient on the LBO dummy is in-
versely related to the variance of the LBO dummy, hence inversely related
to e, the coefficient on the five-year LBO dummy is estimated more
precisely than the coefficients on annual LBO dunies.
?lean productivity differences (eLBOeNON_LBO) and MBO -eNON_FIBO),
by year relative to the year of the LBO or MBO, are reported in Table 6
and plotted in Charts 2 and 3. We don't report differences beyond two
years after the deal since very few plants are observed for more than two
years after the deal (0 declines sharply as kincreases).21 The results
in the first column indicate that plants involved in LBOs in year t
tended to have above-average productivity in every year from t-13 to t+2.
But the relative productivity of LBO plants appears to have declined in
the years prior to the LBO, and then increased sharply beginning at the
time of the LBO. The average value of the difference in three periods is
as follows:
21Recall that plants are observed only through 1986, and the LBOs all
occurred during 1981-86, most of them in the last 3 years.20
Average value of
Period (eL eNoN_L)
I (t—13) to Ct—i) 2.0
II(t—6) to (t—1) 1.2
III t.to(t+2) 2.7
In year t-i-1, the productivity difference is larger (and more significant)
than it was in any previous year, although it declines (and is only
marginally significant) in year t+2. The average productivity difference
increases from 1.2 in the 2 years before the LBO to 2.9 in the 2 years
after the LEO.
In many respects, the pattern of productivity differences for MBOs
is similar (although more pronounced) to the pattern for LBOs: the
average value of - is2.3 in period I, 1.2 in period II,
and 5.9 in period III. Relative productivity of ?IBO plants was as high
as 3.6 in t-11 but fell to essentially zero 6 to 4 years before the IIBO.
But the relative productivity of MBO plants apparently began to increase
about three years before the MBO, and reached a record (until that point)
high of 4.9 in year t-1. Despite this, the average productivity residual
increased from 3.6 in the two years before to 7.5 in the two years after
the MEO. The difference between the productivity increases associated
with ?fBOs and LEOs using annual measures is even greater than that
suggested by the five-year growth-rate results.
While the data clearly indicate buyouts tend to be followed by
substantial increases in productivity, the causal interpretation of this
correlation is open to question. In particular, one could argue (1) that
there is exogenous variation in plants' expected increase in relative
productivity; (2) that plants with large expected productivity increases
(about which management may have private information) are most likely to21
be acquired via an LBO; and (3) that actual productivity growth is a
noisy indicator of expected productivity growth. Smith (1989) considered
arguments of this sort, and although she could not rule them out entirely,
she presented evidence which suggested that they could not account for
the post-buyout improvement in performance. First, no improvement in
performance was found following 24 unsuccessful MBO proposals. Second,
the improvement in performance following nondefensive HBOs and/or MBOs
initiated by current management --themost likely context for potential
gains from trading on inside information via an MBO --tendedto be no
greater than the improvement following other ?lBOs.
In our 1987 paper we estimated differences in mean productivity
between plants involved in ownership changes (of all types) and plants
not so involved, which we denote by - eNONOC).Those differences
(calculated from t-7 to t+7) also exhibited a U-shaped time-path (whose
turning point approximately coincided with the date of ownership change),
but the position of the path was "shifted down": the productivity
differences were negative in every year. As noted earlier, due to data
limitations we can't really identify the LBO and MBO productivity trajec-
tories past year t+2, but if we assumed them to be similar in shape to
the (e -
eNON..0C)trajectory for the years after t+2 (as they are for
the years before and including t+2), we could infer that they continue to
rise (or at least do not fall) after t+2.
IV. Decomposition of productivity changes into output and input changes
The preceding evidence is quite consistent with the hypothesis that
plants involved in LBOs --andespecially in HEOs --experiencehigher
rates of productivity growth than other plants in the same industry, and
that the relative productivity increases occur at or near the time of the22
buyout. By definition, differences in productivity growth rates aredue
to differences floutputgrowth rates, differences in input (capital,
labor, and materials) growth rates, or both. In this section we provide
a decomposition of the productivity changes into outputand input
changes.
The first column of Table 7 indicates that LBO (and particularly
MBO) plants had higher growth rates of output during 1981-86 thannon-LBO
plants, but the differences aren't statistically significant.We can't
reject the hypothesis that buyout plants had a constantmarket share
during this period. In light of our productivity findings,this implies
that buyout plants had lower growth rates of total input. The last three
columns of the table indicate that the growth rates of labor, and partic-
ularly of capital (but not of materials), were significantly lower inthe
case of all LBOs. Among the subset of MBO plants, these differences in
growth rates were also negative, but smaller and not significant.
As discussed earlier, the problem with interpreting the 5-year
growth rate differences is that they don't reveal the precise timingof
movements relative to the date of the buyout. To shed light on this
question, we present in Table 8 differences in annual growth rates of
output and inputs in year t+k (k =-2,1,0,1,2)between plants involved
and not involved in LBOs in year t. As noted above, due to the relative-
ly small number of LBOs in any given year the standard errors on the
differences are fairly large. The differences in capital and labor
growth are negative in every year, these differences are significant only
in the years before the LBO (years t-2, t-1, and t). In the case of all
three inputs, the average difference in growth rates is lower (more
negative) in the 3 years before the LBO than it is in the 2 years after.23
Thus, although the relative (to industry mean) amount of inputs utilized
in LBO plants is lower several years after the buyout than it was several
years before, input use was declining prior to the buyout, and at a
faster rate than it was after the buyout.
The Census establishment data enable us to examine the behavior of
labor-related variables other than total labor input. Table 9 reports
differences between LBO plants and non-LBO plants in the growth rates of
the wage bill B (total labor income generated), employment E, and the
annual wage rate WA B/E, separately for nonproduction and production
workers, by year relative to the year of the LBO. Nonproduction workers
account for about 30 percent of total employment in manufacturing estab-
lishments. It also reports differences in growth rates of the hourly
wage rate WH and of annual hours of work per employee H for production
workers only (hours of nonproduction workers are not reported in the
survey). These growth rates are interrelated since (using dot super-
scripts to denote growth rates):
A
=E + WH+ii
Thefirst column of the table reveals that in the three years before the
LBO, the wage bill of nonproduction workers is growing at about the same
rate in 1.30 and non-LBO plants, but in the two years after the LBO, this
wage bill is growing much more slowly in LBO plants: the average annual
rate of relative decline is 5.3 percent. The decline is particularly
pronounced (7.2 percent) in year +2. In contrast, the wage bill of
production workers is slightly increasing in relative terms after the
LBO, so there is a sharp drop in the growth of the ratio of the24
nonproductiOn to production wage bill. Consequently, LBOs might be
interpreted as non-neutral or biased organizational innovations that are
relatively production-labor using and nonproductionlabor saving.
The post-LBO decline in the nonproduction wage bill is almost
equally due to reductions in nonproduction employment and annual wages
(2.7 and 2.6 percent, respectively). Both the employment and especially
the annual wage of nonproduction relative to production workers declines
following LBOs. This suggests that LBOs reduce the demand for
nonproduction workers relative to the demand for production workers.
Because the annual wage of nonproduction employees tends to be substan-
tially (about 53 percent) higher than that of production employees, the
decline in their relative wage would appear to reduce inequality of wages
within LBO plants.
The growth in the annual wage rate of production workers is signifi-
cantly higher in LBO plants than in other plants in the same industry in
the two years following the LBO. About two-thirds of this difference is
attributable to hourly wage rates, and one-third to annual hours. After
an LBO, production-worker employment declines (in relative terms) at an
average annual rate of 0.9 percent, but total hours of productionworkers
(KH) decline more slowly than they did during the three years before
the LBO.
To sunuarize the preceding observations:
1) Total hours worked by production workers decline more slowly
after the LBO than before the LEO.
2) Hourly and (especially) annual wage rates of production workers
increase after a buyout.
3) Both employment and annual wages of nonproduction workers decline
sharply after a buyout.25
It is interesting to consider the increase in production-workerwages and
the decrease in relative employment of nonproduction workers in post-LBO
plants from the perspective of "efficiency wage" theory.22 A premise of
that theory is that the firm has two alternative means of inducing
(production) workers to expend effort (which it is costly for the firm to
monitor): the "carrot" of high wages (paying a wage premium) and the
"stick" of intensive supervision (a high ratio of nonproduction to
production workers). Our evidence is consistent with the view that in
the course of the pre- to post-LBO transition management increases the
use of the carrot and reduces the use of the stick.
V. Plant closings
The differences between buyout and non-buyout plants in productivi-
ty, output and inputs reported in Tables 5 through 9 were all based on
the subset of "surviving" plants, i.e. plants present in the LRD in 1981
that had not closed by some subsequent year. Calculations for any
particular year during the period 1981-86 were based on all plants ever
in the sample that had not closed prior to that year. Because the plants
that close are likely to be a nonrandom sample (in terms of their produc-
tivity, for example) of all plants, estimates based on the "censored"
sample of surviving establishments may be biased. Unfortunately, non-
random censoring of observations in a longitudinal context poses extreme-
ly difficult methodological problems;23 our objective here is simply to
22See Bartel and Lichtenberg (1988) for a recent discussion of
efficiency-wage theory.
23See Pakes and Ericson (1989) for a recent, very sophisticated
attempt to address some of these problems.26
document the extent of plant failure (closing) and to trytoassess the
direction of bias in our comparisons of buyout and nonbuyout plants.
First, we provide some evidence concerning the relationship between
productivity and plant closing. Table 10 shows differencesin the mean
productivity residual in each of the years 1972-81 between plantsthat
closed and didn't close in 1981. The productivity of plants closing in
1981 was significantly lower than that of other plants in each of the ten
years prior to closing, and the productivity gap waswidening as the
closing date approached. In addition to having negativeand declining
levels of relative productivity, columns 2 and 3 of the table show that
plants destined to close in the future have negative and generally
declining relative rates of output and employment growth.
Since Table 10 shows that the probability of (future) plant closing
is inversely related to productivity, and Table 6 revealed that LBO (and
especially MBO) plants exhibit above-average productivity around thedate
of (especially after) the buyout, one would expect there to be a lower
incidence of plant closings among LBO (and especially MBO) plants than
among non-buyout plants.
Table 11 presents rates of plant closing in each of the years
1981-86 for six cohorts of LBO and NBO plants and for all plants in our
extract of the LRD. These are conditional rates of closing, i.e. rela-
tive frequencies of closing in year t among plants that have not closed
prior to year t. The top panel of the table shows closing rates among
plants involved in all LBOs (both MBOs and other LBOs). There are a
total of 21 year-specific closing rates for the 6 LBO cohorts, and 11 of
these are smaller, and 10 are larger, than the rates for all sample
plants in the corresponding year. These data therefore give the27
impression that plants previously involved in LBOs are neither more nor
less likely to close than other plants.24 The apparent lack of a
difference may be partly due to the fact that, although LBO plants are
more productive, they are also somewhat smaller (mean employment 17 to 25
percent lower) than non-LBO plants, and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson
(1987) have shown that large plants are less likely to close. In con-
trast, only S of the 21 MBO plant closing rates, shown in the bottom half
of the table equal or exceed the closing rates for all sample plants in
the corresponding year. The preponderance of zeroes for the 1981 and
1982 MBO cohorts may partly be an artifact of the small number of MBO
plants in those cohorts (16 or less in each), but even among the last 4
cohorts (whose minimum initial size was 57), only 3 out of 10 equal or
exceed their corresponding year's rate for all sample plants. Thus MBO
plants appear to be appreciably less likely to close than plants not
involved in LBOs. Our finding a difference for these plants but not for
LBO plants in general may be due not only to the markedly higher produc-
tivity of these plants, but also to their greater size --theyare only 1
to 13 percen.. smaller, on average, than plants not involved in buyouts.
The lower rates of plant closing among plants involved in management
buyouts suggest that estimates of differences between MBOand non-NBO
plants based on the censored sample may be downward biased.Tables 5 and
6 may underestimate the productivity increase associated with management
buyouts, and the estimated differences in output and input growthof NBO
plants reported in Table 7 may be too negative.
24This impression is confirmed by a comparison of the"survival rates"
--thecumulative products of one minus the previous closingrates
--ofthe two groups of plants.28
VI. R & D investment
We examined above the relationship between LBOs and the growth of
the capital stock, which is closely related to the rate of net investment
in plant and equipment. In this section we investigate the relationship
between LBOs and investment in research and development. There is
considerable evidence that R&D investment has a significant positive
impact on long-run productivity growth.25 Due to data limitations, we
were able above to analyze only the short-run (within two-year) "effect"
of buyouts on TFP. Analysis of the link between buyouts and R&D invest-
ment may provide at least indirect evidence concerning the implications
of buyouts for long-run productivity growth.26
The LRD does not contain any information about investment in R&D in
manufacturing establishments. Even if it did, such information would not
be very meaningful. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989a, p. 8) reported that
47 percent of personnel engaged in R&D are employed in "auxiliary estab-
lishments" (including central administrative offices and R&D laborato-
ries) rather than in manufacturing establishments. R&D is a relatively
centralized function within companies, and since the output of R&D is a
relatively "public good" (easily diffused across the company's estab-
lishments), it. is the amount of R&D conducted in the entire company,
rather than in specific establishments, that determines their productivi-
ty. This is presumably the reason why the government's official survey
25See Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989b) for an econometric analysis of
this impact based on Census microdata.
26From another perspective, by examining the effects of LBOs on R&D as
well as on (short-run) TIP, we are assessing their impact on dynamic
as well as static (technical) efficiency.29
of industrial R&D activity --theNSF/Census RD-isurvey--isa firm-
levelsurvey.
Weused data from the RD-i survey to assess the impact of LBOs on
R&D investment. Our strategy is to compare the change in average R&D
intensity (one measure of which is the ratio of R&D investment to sales)
of firms involved in LBOs ("LBO firms") to that of all firms. We have
two reasons for choosing R&D-intensity (rather than, for example, real
R&D expenditure) as the measure to be examined. First, a reduced-form
relationship between TFPgrowthand R&D-intensity can be formally derived
from a production function which includes as an argument the stock of
"knowledge capital," and such a relationship has been estimated in
numerous studies.27 Second, LBOs are frequently followed by the
divestiture of divisions of the acquired company; such divestitures would
tend to artificially depress the change in real R&D, but not the change
in R&D-intensity (unless the most R&D-intensive divisions were most
likely to be divested.)
Because the RD-i data are at the firm level, we will include only
LBOs of entire firms, and not of divisions of firms, in our set of "LBO
firms." Recall from Table 3 that there were 80 major LEOs of entire
firms involving companies observed in the Census data and that these
accounted for about 70 percent of the aggregate value of LBOs. 43 out of
these 80 companies were included in the sample of RD-i survey firms in
each of the years i978-86. These 43 companies comprise our set of "LBO
firms."
27See, e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (198gb).30
Sample mean values of R&D-intensity in the years 1978-86 for both
the 43 LBO firms and for all R&D performers are presented in Table 12.
Two alternative measures of R&D-intensity are used: the ratio of R&D
expenditure to sales (RDINT1), and the ratio of the number of full-time—
equivalent R&D scientists and engineers to total company employment
(RDINT2). The mean values for LBO firms of both these measures tended to
increase over this 9—year period, and were never higher than they were in
the last year, by which all the buyouts were completed. The mean values
of RDINT1 and RDINT2 for LBO firms were respectively 50 percent and 21
percent greater in 1986 than they had been in 1978. The averageR&D
intensity of all R&D-performers in the RD—i sample was also increasing
28
significantly during the period.The relative R&D intensity of LBO
firms (shown in the last column) therefore increased less than the
absolute R&D intensity, but it increased nevertheless, particularly in
the last 3 years, during which most of the LBOs occurred.
The data in Table 12 cast doubt on the hypothesis that LBOs are
associated with reductions in the propensity to perform R&D. Another way
of examining the data, which accounts more closely for the timing of the
LBOs, also yields results inconsistent with the hypothesis. For each of
the years 1981-86, we identified the set of firms that were involved in
an LBO either in that year or in a previous year. For both these firms
and for all firms we then calculated the proportion of firms which had
increased their R&D-intensity since the previous year. The results are
28To an important extent, this increase --evenin the
"company-financed" component --maybeattributable to the large
U.S. military buildup during the period. See Lichtenberg (1988) for
discussion of this point.31
presented in Table 13. The proportion for firms involved in current or
past LBOs is never lower than the proportion for all firms, and is equal
in only one year.
There have been at least two large-scale studies of the effect of
changes in ownership (mergers and acquisitions) in general on R&D invest-
ment: Hall (1988) and Lichtenberg-Siegel (1989a). Both found essen-
tially no difference in the growth of R&D between firms involved and not
involved in ownership change. We are aware of only one very limited
attempt to assess the effects of LBOs in particular on R&D; it is de-
scribed in a Feb. 1, 1989 memorandum by the National Science Foundation
(NSF) prepared in response to a request from the Subcounittee on Telecom-
munications and Finance of the House Coittee on Energy and Comerce.
NSF identified 8 companies among the top 200 R&D performers involved in
"LBOs or other restructurings," and determined that these companies
reduced their R&D expenditure by 12.8 percent from 1986 to 1987. In
contrast, other top-200 companies not involved in mergers, LBOs or other
restructurings increased their R&D spending by 5.4 percent.
NSF granted to us access to their list of 8 companies involved in
"Ls or other restructurings"; only one of these companies appeared on
our presumably comprehensive list of major LBOs. The rest of the compa-
nies were evidently involved in "other restructurings" such as stock
repurchases. There are at least 3 reasons, therefore, why the figures
calculated by NSF might be regarded as very unreliable estimates ofthe
effects of LBOs per se on R&D investment:(1) only one of the eight
companies was actually involved in an LBO; (2) NSF calculatedthe change
in R&D in only a single year; and (3) they evaluated the changein the
level of R&D, rather than in R&D intensity, which is misleadingif the32
companies are divesting divisions --afrequent concomitant of
restructuring.
VII. Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the effects of leveraged buyouts
on productivity and related aspects of firm behavior using large longitu-
dinal establishinent and firm-level Census Bureau data sets linked to a
list of LBOs compiled from public data sources. About 5 percent, or
1100, of the roughly 20,000 relatively large manufacturingestablishments
represented in our extract from the LRD file were involved in anLBO
during the period 1981-86. This is about one-fourth the fractionin-
volved in all types of mergers and acquisitions.
We found that plants involved in LBOs during 1981-86 had signifi-
cantly (about 14 percent) higher rates of productivity growth over that
five-year span than other plants in the same industry. The productivity
impact of LBOs is much larger than previous estimates of the productivity
impact of all mergers and acquisitions. Among IlBOs --thesubset of LBOs
in which the acquiror includes the managers of the acquired unit --the
productivity growth differential was even larger --about20 percent.
Two factors which may contribute to the relative productivity
increase among LBO plants are: (1) increased intensity of effort by
labor, and more generally, increased utilization of all employed inputs,
due to increased sensitivity of their financial rewards (and penalties)
to their performance; and (2) reduction in the proportion of resources
misallocated to inefficient activities, due to curtailment of "free cash
flow" and to more intensive monitoring of managers by investors.
Our previous research suggests that a significant fraction of the
productivity gains associated with changes in corporate control are due33
to reductions in central-office overhead. Since data on central offices
were unfortunately not available for this investigation, the estimated
productivity gains may substantially understate the true gains.
The estimates suggest that plants involved in LBOs had above-average
levels of productivity 10 to 12 years prior to the buyout, but experi-
enced gradual declines in subsequent years until they were just above
average on the eve of the buyout. In the year of or following the
buyout, the relative productivity of these plants increases sharply to a
level higher than that ever previously observed. The productivity of
plants involved in MBOs appears to increase several years before the
buyout, although their productivity advantage widens considerably after
the buyout. Plants involved in "garden-varietyt' ownership changes have
productivity significantly below average inmediately prior to the trans-
action; plants involved in LBOs are no worse than average, and those
involved in MBOs are better than average.
The difference in 1981-86 productivity growth rates between LBO
plants and non-LEO plants is mostly due to lower input growth,rather
than higher output growth, of the former. Plants involved in LEOs during
1981-86 tended to employ less capital and labor, relative to the industry
average, in 1986 than they did in 1981. Butthe relative quantities of
capital and labor employed in LEO plants were decliningfor several years
before the buyout as well as for several years after, andthe rate of
decline was smaller (and less significant) after. LBOs arethus associ-
ated with a reduction in the rate of (relative) downsizing.
LBOs tend to be preceded or followed by significantand differential
changes in the wages, hours, and employment of productionand
nonproduction employees. Total hours worked by productionworkers34
declinemore slowly after than before the LBO. Their hourlyand (espe-
cially) annual wage rates increase after the buyout.In stark contrast,
both the employment and wages of nonproduction workersdecline sharply
following an LBO. These findings suggest that LBOs areassociated with
reductions in intraplant wage dispersion and also with increasedreliance
on wage incentives, and reduced reliance on monitoring bysupervisors, to
elicit effort on the part of production workers. LBOs appear tobe
productionlabOrusiflg, nonproductioxrlaborSaviflg, organizational
innovations.
The results summarized above are based on the censored sample of
surviving establishments, i.e. plants that close areexcluded from the
productivity, output and input growth calculations. (About12 percent of
the plants present in 1981 are known to have closed within the nextfive
years.) Plants involved in management buyouts (but not inLBOs general-
ly) were less likely to subsequently close than other plants, as one
would expect given their relative productivity and the inverse relation-
ship between productivity and the likelihood of plant closing.Conse-
quently, censoring of failing establishments may result in downwardly
biased estimates of differences between MBO and non-NBO plants in produc-
tivity, output and input growth.
The final issue we investigated empirically was the effect of LBOs
on R&D-intensity, which has previously been shown to be a significant
determinant of the long-run rate of productivity growth. Because R&D is
generally a firm- as opposed to establishment-level function, analysisof
this issue was based on a distinct set of data, the RD-i survey panel.
We found that the average R&D-intensity of a subset of 43 firms involved
in (complete-firm) LBOs increased substantially during the period35
1978-86. The R&D-intensity of all firms was also generally rising during
this period, but at a rate no faster than that of the R&D-intensity of
LBO firms. These findings are not at all consistent with the hypothesis
that LBOs are associated with reductions in the propensity of firms to
invest in R&D.36
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Mergers and Acquisitions, various issues.Table 1
Aggregate Value and Number of




















Deals of all sizes
$3093 99 $31.2 $82600 2395 $34.5
3452 164 21.0 53700 2346 22.9
4520 231. 19.6 73000 2533 28.8
18810 253 74.3 122300 2543 48.1
18030 254 71.0 179700 3001 59.9
46620 333 140.0 173100 3336 51.9
Dealsofvalue >$35million
1981 3136 17 184.5 71128 235 302.7
1982 3422 21 162.9 47836 246 194.5
1983 3853 30 128.4 63532 306 207.6















Sources: Deals of all sizes:
LBOs: Mergers and Acquisitions
M&As: W.T. Grim & Co.
Deals of value >$35million:
Securities Industry Association data base.
Value figures are in millions of dollar.39
Table 2
Value and Number of Leveraged Buyouts
Involving Companies Observed in Census LRD Extract
Leveraged Buyouts of I
value >$35m. involvingI
companies observed in I All leveraged buyouts I
Census LRD extract I of value >$35m. I
(1) (2) (3) )(4) (5) (6) % of % of
Total Average I Total Average Value deals
ValueNumberValue Value Number Value (1)1(4) (2)/(5)
1981 2545.4 13 195.8I 3136.4 17 184.5 I81.2 76.5
1982 2437.4 14 174.1I 3421.5 21 162.9 71.2 66.7
1983 2195.2 16 137.2I 3852.7 30 128.4 57.0 53.3
1984 10767.6 27 398.8 118804.9 53 354.8 I57.3 50.9
1985 6033.624 251.4 113035.6 44 296.3 I46.3 54.5
1986 24956.5 37 674.5 143849.9 79 555.1 I56.9 46.8
total 48935.9 131 373.6 186101.0 244 352.9 I56.8 53.7
period
I IChart 1
Procedure for Determining Whether or Not
an LRD establishment was involved in an LBO
During a Particular year
company name














division(s) involved Yes Involved
in LBO include SIC >inLBO







LBOs of value >$35m.
involving companies observed










of firm 25248 111 227.5 12992 51 254.7
All LBOs 86101 244 352.9 48941 131 373.6
I
Cumulative Value and Number of LeveragedSuyouts




Al]. LBOs of Value '$35m.
Total Average
Value Number Value
$38982 116 $336.1 $13220 48 $275.4
457.5 3594942
Table4
Distribution of LRDestablishmentsinvolved in major LROs during
1981-86, by type of LBO
Other
HBO LBO
FULL-FIRII LBO 239 553 791
(percent) 21.1 48.9
(row percent) 30.2 69.8
(column percent) 59.9 75.4
PARTIAL-FIRMLEO 160 180 340
(percent) 14.1 15.9
(row percent) 47.1 52.9
(columnpercent) 40.1 24.6
399 733
Note: sums do not exactly match because several plants were involved
in more than one type of transaction.Table 5
Estimates of Parameter in Equation (2):
Effects of LBOs and MBOs on Productivity Growth
Independent variable
LBO tBO
Productivity measure duy dummy
Raw residual .028 .039
(2.7) (2.3)
Studentized residual .100 .134
(2.9) (2.4)
Note: t -statisticsin parentheses.
43Table 6
Differences Between Buyout Plants and Non-Buyout Plants


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Differences Between Buyout and Non-Buyout Plants in Mean
Cumulative 1981-86 Growth Rates of Output and Inputs
Ct-statistics in parentheses)
Output Capital Labor Materials
LBO plants 0.7 -6.4 -3.2 0.2
(0.4) (3.9) (1.8) (0.1)
MBOplants 2.5 -2.9 -1.4 -0.5
(0.7) (1.1) (0.5) (0.1)
NOTE: Each of the estimates reported above is an
estimate of the coefficient a in a regression
of the form.
n Z86. =a+aB08186. +a£n Z81. + + V.
i 0 1 i. 2 1j
whereZ86 and 281 denote output, capital, labor,
or materials in 1986 and 1981, respectively;
B08186 equals 1 if the plant was even involved
in an LBO (or tIBO) during 1981-86, and otherwise
equals zero; y. represents a complete set of
industry dummies; and the subscript i is the plant
index.48
Table8
Differences Betwen LBO plants and Non-LBO Plants in
Mean Growth Rates (in percent) of Output and Inputs,
by year relative to year of LBO
Year Output Capital Labor Materials
-2 0.5 —0.9 -1.9 1.2
(0.4) (2.4) (1.1) (0.6)
-l 0.3 -0.4 -2.9 -0.8
(0.2) (1.0) (2.4) (0.4)
O -0.0 _0.8* -0.9 -1.3
(0.0) (1.8) (0.8) (0.7)
1 —0.7 —0.1 —1.3 2.5
(0.5) (0.3) (0.9) (1.0)
2 -0.2 -0.9 -1.0 -0.5
(0.1) (1.4) (0.6) (0.2)
Averages
—2,—1,0 0.3 —0.7 -1.9 -0.3
(Before)
1,2 —0.5 —0.5 -1.2 1.0
(After)
t-statistics in parentheses
*significantlydifferent from zero at .05 level
(one-tailed test)
AAsignificantlydifferent from zero at .01 level
(one-tailed test)
Year 0 is the year in which the LBO occurs (is
completed). The growth rates refer to changesfrom
the previous year, e.g., the growth rate for year-2 is
the change from year -3 to year -2.49
TabLe 9
Differences Between LBO Plants and Non-LBO Plants
in Mean Growth Rates (in percent) of Labor Variables,
By Year Relative to Year of LB0
(t—statistics in parentheses)
Annual Hourly Annual
Wage bill Employment wage rate wage ratehours
Year N PNP N P N-P N P N-P P p
-2 3.5 -0.64.11.3 -0.01.32.2 -0.62.8-0.0 -1.6
(2.5) (0.7) (3.0)(1.2) (0.0) (1.2)(2.1) (1.2) (2.3)(0.0) (1.4)
-1 -2.6 -0.3 -2.3-2.70.1 -2.80.1 -0.40.5 0.6 -2.7
(2.3) (0.3) (2.4)(2.4) (0.1) (2.7)(0.8) (0.5) (0.4)(0.8) (2.2)
0 -3.1 -0.4 -2.7-3.1 —0.3 -2.8-0.0 -0.10.1 0.0 -0.8
(3.1) (0.3) (2.1)(2.7) (0.4) (2.2)(0.0) (0.2) (0.1)(0.1) (0.7)
1 -3.40.8 -4.2-3.3 -1.4 -1.9-0.12.2 -2.3 1.7 -1.7
(2.3) (0.5) (2.7)(2.4) (1.3) (1.3)(0.1) (2.7) (1.5)(1.9) (1.1)
2 -7.21.2 -8.4-2.1 -0.3 -1.8-5.11.5 -6.6 0.6 1.2
(4.4) (0.8) (4.8)(1.3) (0.3) (1.2)(3.6) (1.8) (3.8)(0.6) (0.7)
Averages
Before-0.7 -0.4 -0.3-1.5 -0.1 -1.40.8 -0.41.2 0.2 -1.7
(—2,—i ,0)
After-5.31.0 -6.3—2.7 -0.9 -1.8 —2.61.9 -4.5 1.2 -0.3
(1,2)
After--4.61.4 -6.0-1.2 -0.8 -0.4-3.42.3 -5.7 1.0 1.4
Before
Note: N denotes nonproduction workers
P denotes production workers50
Table 10
Plants Closing in 1981:
Mean Deviation From Respective Industry Means of
Productivity Levels, Output Growth, and Employment Growth, 1972-81




























-.086 -. 136 -. 132
(.013) (.023) (.015)
1981 —.184 —.839 —.759
(.023) (.043) (.038)
Note:482 plants closed in 1981
18768 plants remained open in 1981Table 11
Conditional Rates of Plant Closing (in percent)
for LBO or ?IBO plants, by Cohort,
and for all sample Plants, 1981-86
51
1.9
All sample1981 LBO1982 LBO1983 LBO1984 LBO1985 LBO1986 LBO
Year Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants
1981 2.3 1.2
1982 2.9 7.0 2.5
1983 2.6 4.7 0.8
1984 1.6 2.3 0.8
1985 2.0 0.0 1.7
1986 1.9 3.5 3.4
All sample1981 NBC1982 ?tBO1983 ?IBO1984 MBO1985 NBO1986 MBO









1982 2.9 16.7 0.0
1983 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.6
1984 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.9
1985 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.8










Intensityof Intensity of All
Year LBO Firms R&DPerformers (1)+(2)
A. R&DExpenditure+ Sales
1978 1.2% 2.9% .41
1979 1.2 2.9 .41
1980 1.4 3.0 .47
1981 1.4 3.4 .41
1982 1.6 3.5 .46
1983 1.7 3.7 .46
1984 1.5 3.6 .42
1985 1.5 3.7 .41
1986 1.8 34 .53
B. R&DScientists& Engineers ÷TotalEmployment
1978 1.4 3.1 .45
1979 1.4 3.3 .42
1980 1.5 3.2 .47
1981 1.5 3.3 .45
1982 1.5 3.8 .39
1983 1.5 3.9 .38
1984 1.5 3.8 .39
1985 1.7 4.0 .43
1986 1.7 3.6 .47
52Table 13
Proportions of (Current or Previous) LBO Firms
and of all Firms Increasing R&D -Intensity
From Previous Year
Firms Involved in
LBOs in Current All R&D-
Year or Previous Years Performing Firms
1981 50% 20%
1982 75 55
1983 41 30
1984 29 29
1985 48 38
1986 37 31
53